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Profits, Welfare, and Class Position:
1965-1984
MARcus D. POHLMANN
Rhodes College
Department of Political Science
The study utilizes an extended version of a Charles V Hamilton par-
adigm in order to estimate yearly income transfers between classes in
America's system of "welfare state capitalism." Analyzing the period
from 1965 to 1984, what becomes most obvious is the substantial an-
nual transfer from the middle/working class to the owning class. The
transfer rose to more than $150 billion by 1984-a full 10% of middle/
working class income. Yet when looking at the implications, an inter-
esting paradox emerges. Although the amount of transfer has increased
some over the period, it has not grown nearly as fast as the after-tax
income gap between the two classes. Those at the top have gotten
sizably richer, while those beneath them have actually been witnessing
a real-dollar income decline. Ultimately, this is attributed to both a
postindustrial income bimodality within the non-elite population as
well as a redistribution downward within that group. Frustrated by
their own declining economic status, however, middle Americans at
least temporarily turn a good bit of their wrath towards welfare recip-
ients and not the owners of capital-much as Hamilton predicted.
This study concludes that the rich are getting richer and the
poor poorer in the United States. That will come as no real
surprise to the more than three-quarters of the American public
who are already convinced of that (Harris, 1983). The study also
concludes that the average American pays a sizable share of his
or her paycheck to government each year and is not pleased
about having that hard-earned money go to many of the present
welfare recipients. What is somewhat less obvious, though, is
that a significant portion of those paychecks also goes to the
owners of corporate capital-as a sort of "tribute" for the priv-
ilege of living in the country they own; and, government, wel-
fare recipients, and this owning dass interrelate to create that
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reality. The documentation and explanation of how that happens
are the primary foci of this study.
By utilizing an extended version of the "conduit colonialism"
model first developed by Charles V. Hamilton (1972), the study
attempts to provide a relatively unique perspective on the func-
tioning of America's liberal-capitalist political economy. But
where Hamilton focused on the systemic functions of the poor
as welfare recipients, this study extends his model to focus on
the systemic functions of the middle/working class as well. What
is found is that the owning class is enriched at the expense of
the middle/working and lower classes. This runs directly con-
trary to the prevalent contemporary notion that if the rich are
allowed to get richer, most everybody else will benefit by virtue
of a "trickle down" effect.
The primary goal is to estimate yearly income transfers be-
tween classes over the period from 1965 to 1984. Analyzing the
functioning of the American political economy during that pe-
riod has a number of advantages. For example, those living in
"poverty" were not regularly singled out for systematic study by
the Census Bureau prior to 1965. In addition, the period encom-
passes both economic slumps and booms as well as significant
variations in governmental taxing and spending orientations.
Before beginning, however, three more methodological notes are
in order.
First, the operation of the economic system is a dynamic
process. Corporate profits, for example, generally are not hoarded
away in the vaults of the owning class. Instead, they are often
spun back into the economy in the form of investments, bo-
nuses, and the like. What this study provides, on the other hand,
is a year-end snapshot of this process; and when viewed over
time, these year-end snapshots should provide a reasonable in-
dication of which class groupings have been gaining and which
have been losing in the course of this dynamic arrangement.
Secondly, some of the operational definitions have been dic-
tated by data availability, e.g., the "owning class" will be op-
erationally defined as the top 5% of American families in terms
of income; although for a measure of their wealth, an estimate
of the wealth held by the top 5% of adults has been used. In
actuality, the author would have preferred to use the top 1% of
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wealthholders for both operationalizations, but there was simply
not enough parallel data available over time.
Lastly, some of the developments are analyzed over slightly
different time periods, e.g., wealth concentrations are only
measured through 1982, and not 1984, because the most recent
comparable data were available for those periods.
Such is the crudity often involved in working with others'
data. Nevertheless, this study should provide some empirical
guideposts.
The Conceptual Model
Government
At least in domestic policy-making, it can be argued that
government (meaning federal, state, and local levels combined),
has come to play three basic roles: allocation, stabilization, and
redistribution. Allocation is the provision of maintenancce, or
"housekeeping," services. These include police and fire protec-
tion, educating the young, keeping the streets and highways
paved, and so on. Stabilization involves government using fiscal
and monetary policies to help maintain a healthy, growing econ-
omy. If successful, these actions will have helped secure ade-
quate numbers of jobs, goods, and services for an ever-increasing
American population. Lastly, through redistribution, govern-
ment attempts to compensate those who suffer significant eco-
nomic hardship in the course of this process. It does so by using
tax revenues to provide assistance in such forms as Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and unemployment
compensation.
Owning Class (Hamilton's "Welfare Beneficiaries")
These are the people who assume the chore of accumulating
the bulk of the nation's wealth; and in the process, it is hoped
that they will create relatively stable patterns of capital invest-
ment. Their discretion in the latter regard adds considerable
economic and political power to the personal and familial se-
curity their wealth provides (Pohlmann, 1986, pp. 150-285).
As operationalized in this study, this group is defined as the
top 5% of American families in terms of income, which in 1984
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had incomes exceeding $73,200. Each of these families generally
had assets of at least $200,000, stock valued in excess of $50,000,
and received more than one quarter of their incomes from busi-
ness investments. As a group, they have consistently owned
nearly two-thirds of the nation's stock or more (IRS, 1929-1986;
New York Times, 1986; Edwards, 1978, p. 306; Smith and Frank-
lin, 1974).
Besides wages, gifts, and inheritance, their income is derived
from at least three other sources: the exploitation of employees,
as well as direct and indirect governmental aid. The exploitation
of employees involves making profits from investments of their
capital by charging more for products and services than em-
ployees are paid to produce and distribute them (Marx, 1935).
Direct governmental aid includes government subsidies like low
interest loans and tax abatements, besides profits derived from
contracts with government for building highways, bombers,
housing, and so on. Indirect governmental aid is the profit at-
tained when selling goods and services to the publicly subsi-
dized indigent, persons who will be called "welfare recipients"
from here on.
Welfare Recipients
For the purposes of this study, this group has been opera-
tionally defined as the bottom 20% of American families in
terms of income, those who have generally been eligible to re-
ceive one or more forms of "public assistance" from the Welfare
State. Their 1984 incomes were less than $12,489 and they owned
virtually no assets whatsoever (IRS).
Middle/Working Class (MC/WC) Work Force and Tax Base
These people, the remaining 75% of American families whose
incomes fall between $12,489 and $73,200, also find themselves
caught in an economic predicament. They work in either the
private or public sector to produce the nation's goods and serv-
ices. Most are employees of the owning class, working for a
wage that is less than the market value of what they produce.
In addition, taxation deprives them of a significant portion of
their incomes, while billions of dollars of their tax payments end
up in the hands of the owning class.
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What is left for those who work for a living? If, for example,
the 1977 average tax rate is applied to the 1977 median family
income, that typical family was left with $9,380 at a time when
the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that it would cost such
a family $11,367 to meet an "intermediate budget" for food, shel-
ter, clothing, transportation, and personal and medical care (In-
formation, 1979, p. 60; Sherman, 1972, pp. 50-51). And without
a cushion of wealth to fall back on if times get significantly
worse, these middle/working class people find themselves quite
economically vulnerable. A five-year University of Michigan
study, for example, concluded that seven out of ten American
families have at least an even chance of spending some years of
their lives in "economic distress," most likely the result of a
family losing the paycheck of one of its breadwinners (New York
Times, 1977b; Levison, 1974; Shostak, 1969). 1
Much of this should become clearer by examining "Welfare
State Capitalism" in the United States. The model contains seven
junctures where money is transferred from one group of partic-
ipants to another. These have been labelled: private-sector prof-
its, personal taxes, diret subsidies, contract profits, interest
profits, public assistance, and conduit profits. Lastly, there is
the venting of pent-up frustration that is termed "directed wrath."
(Domhoff, 1967; Hamilton, 1972; Harrington, 1984; Piven and
Cloward, 1971; Millband, 1969; O'Connor, 1973; Parenti, 1983).
Welfare State Capitalism
Private-Sector Profits
When the owning class invests its money in corporations it
expects something in return. What it gets in return are profits.
These, as mentioned above, derive from paying the workers less
than the market value of what they have produced. In other
words, this is a return to capital, not to labor.
These corporate profits have accounted for at least 10% of all
national income throughout most of this century. In the period
under study, they rose from 119.7 to 124.4 in billions of constant
1984 dollars, after subtracting the owners' taxes, profits from
transactions with government, and adjustments for inventory
valuation and capital depreciation (See Table 1). There was sig-
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nificant fluctuation over the period, but profits have now reached
their highest level in 20 years and appear to be climbing to new
heights . 2
Personal Taxes
By 1984, Americans were paying nearly $700 billion in taxes
every year. And when looking at this tax burden imposed by
federal, state, and local governments combined, it is quite clear
that the United States does not have a progressive tax system.
In 1980, for example, economist Joseph Pechman (1985, p. 52)
found the poorest one-tenth of American families made 1.3% of
all adjusted family income before taxes, and still had only 1.3%
of it afterwards. While at the other end of the income spectrum,
the wealthiest one-tenth made 33.1% of all adjusted family in-
come before taxes, and had 33.9% of it after all taxes had been
paid.
In 1965, the middle/working class paid some $2597 (1984
dollars) per capita in taxes. That figure grew to a peak of $3528
in 1978, and was still $3178 by 1983-despite a major federal
income tax cut between 1981 and 1983. Thus, as a group, the
middle/working class was paying some $559 billion in taxes by
1983. 3
How government chooses to spend its revenues will be con-
sidered next.
Direct Subsidies
Each year the Survey of Current Business compiles the amount
of governmental subsidies paid to non-governmental enter-
prises-primarily in the agricultural, construction, and trans-
portation industries. Converted to 1984 dollars, the owning class'
share of those subsidies amounted to $11.8 billion in 1965. That
figure then grew to a peak of $17.5 billion in 1983, and was
$16.1 a year later. (See Table 1.)4
Contract Profits
The owning class is also reaping after-tax profits from their
business transactions with government, although these profits
declined somewhat between 1965 and 1984. At the beginning
of that period, as the Viet Nam War raged, the after-tax profits
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from sales to government were estimated to be $7.4 billion in
1984 dollars. That figure dropped below $4 billion in the early
1980s but was $4.3 billion in 1984.5 (See Table 1.) Yet, it should
be remembered that these are quite conservative estimates when
considering that many of government's biggest purchases-e.g.,
most of its defense equipment-are made without competitive
bidding from industries within which profit rates are often con-
siderably higher than the average corporate profit rates used in
the calculations for this paper (New York Times, 1985a, 1985b).
Interest Profits
Governmental indebtedness continues to mount, and thus
government continues to pay more and more interest to its lend-
ers. This has meant an increase in real-dollar after-tax profits
for the owning class. From a 1965 figure of $4.5 billion, for ex-
ample, it is estimated that they have recently begun to make
over $6 billion a year. (See Table 1.) That is a 40% rate of
increase. 6
Public Assistance
Public assistance refers to the host of governmental programs
designed to ease the load of being poor in America, e.g., AFDC,
Medicaid, Food Stamps, Rent Subsidies, and Supplemental Aid
for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled. They provide the poor with
money and vouchers with which they can purchase necessities
of life like food, shelter, clothing, and medical assistance. Be-
ginning primarily with Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and ac-
celerating dramatically during Lyndon Johnson's Great Society
era, such relief payments have grown to quite sizable propor-
tions, e.g., 74 need-based programs provided millions of indi-
gents with over $134 billion worth of "relief" in 1984 (Burke,
1984). The Congressional Research Service refers to these pro-
grams as the "welfare system." Yet, this story does not end here,
for the poor do not eat, wear, and live under these checks and
coupons. Instead, they spend them; and in the process, they
provide additional profit for the owning class.
Conduit Capitalism
Charles V. Hamilton (1972) was one of the first to note the
"conduit" function played by most all relief recipients. As in-
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dicated earlier, this occurs when various proportions of their
governmentally funded purchases flow on to the owning class-
e.g., wealthy landlords, nursing home operators, and the stock-
holders of pharmaceutical companies-as profits from these
transactions. Although it is much more difficult to determine
which of these vendors is making precisely how much money
by serving the poor, it is possible to estimate what the owning
class vendors as a group have made. For example, applying the
average after-tax corporate profit rates to the billions spent on
need-based public assistance programs, there was nearly a tri-
pling of real dollar vendor profits flowing to the owning class
between 1965 and 1984. The figure had risen to some $1.4 billion
by the latter date. (See Table 1.)7
Summary
America's political-economic system does seem to reinforce
existing class relationships. This becomes even more obvious
when the above figures are compiled. (See Table 1.)
In 1965, the American political economy transferred more
than $143 billion (1984 dollars) from the middle/working class
to the owning class. That amounted to some 14% of the income
of the middle/working class.
Although fluctuating with the owning class' private-sector
profits in the years that followed, the total transfer had risen to
more than $150 billion by 1984-still a full 10% of increased
middle/working class income, translated, that means that the
average American is now working more than one month out of
every year in order to supply increased income to the owning
class.
Government was directly involved in about one-fifth of this
transfer, and it was indirectly involved in the rest by means of
its non-progressive tax system, economic regulations, many of
its maintenance services, and so on.
The Bottom Line
As indicated by Figure 2, the rich are indeed getting richer
by the end of this entire process. For example, the poorest own-
ing class family made $54.961 (1984 dollars) in 1965 and $73,230
by 1984. At the same time, the average American family was
clearly better off than in 1965, but has witnessed a real-dollar
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Table 1
Money Transfers From MiddlelWorking Class to Owning Class,
1965-1984
Govern-
Private Govern- ment
Sector ment Debt
Corporate Contract Interest
Profits Govern- Profits Profits
(after ment (after (after
taxes) Subsidies taxes) taxes)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1965 119.7 11.8
1966 113.0 13.0
1967 103.2 10.5
1968 96.0 10.4
1969 81.3 10.7
1970 72.1 11.1
1971 74.6 10.8
1972 94.0 15.1
1973 91.5 12.6
1974 61.6 6.7
1975 76.8 6.4
1976 84.6 6.4
1977 101.6 8.2
1978 110.6 9.7
1979 104.4 9.3
1980 80.1 9.5
1981 83.2 10.2
1982 74.2 12.7
1983 101.6 17.5
1984 124.4 16.1
7.4 4.5
7.3 4.4
7.6 4.6
7.0 4.5
5.5 4.9
4.4 5.4
4.6 6.3
5.5 6.6
4.6 5.3
2.7 4.4
3.9 4.6
3.8 4.1
4.6 4.5
4.7 4.5
4.0 4.3
3.0 4.0
3.5 3.9
3.4 4.5
3.8 5.3
4.3 6.3*
Conduit Total
Profits MC/WC % of
(after "Tribute" MC/WC
taxes) Paid Income
(5) (6) (7)
0.5* 143.9 14
0.8* 138.5 13
1.0* 126.9 12
1.1 119.0 10
1.0* 103.4 9
1.2* 94.2 8
1.2* 97.5 8
1.5* 122.7 9
1.3 115.3 8
0.9* 76.3 6
1.3 93.0 7
1.4 100.3 7
1.7 120.6 9
1.8 131.3 9
1.5 123.5 8
1.1 97.7 7
1.3 102.1 7
1.2 96.0 7
1.3 129.5 9
1.4 152.5 10
All money figures in constant (1984) billions of dollars.
All data are the most recent estimates available in government documents
below.
: extrapolation
Sources: Survey of Current Business, Statistical Abstracts of the United States,
and Congressional Research Service Report 85-194 (1984).
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income loss of more than $1000 since the late 1970s. Lastly,
lower-class families saw their average real-dollar income in-
crease between 1965 and 1973 as the Great Society welfare pro-
grams took effect. Nonetheless, those incomes dropped an
average of over $1500 per family between 1973 and 1984.
In terms of corporate stock, it is estimated that the owning
class held more than three-quarters of it in 1965, and still pos-
sesses nearly two-thirds of it at very least.8 As for the rest of the
stock, much of it is owned in relatively small amounts, and the
average dollar value of these share-holdings has shrunk dra-
matically. For example, the median portfolio was $6,200 in 1985,
less than one-third of what it was a decade earlier; and, it should
be remembered that a growing amount of this investment is
tied up in small tax-sheltered Individual Retirement Accounts,
e.g., approximately $75 billion worth in 1986 (Christian Science
Monitor, 1985; New York Times, 1986).
As for corporate control, Edward S. Greenberg sums it up
this way,
Ironically, the slight disperal that has occurred has probably
enhanced the position of major stockholders, who now require a
lower percentage of voting stock to exercise control in a corporation
than they did in the past. When one considers the coalitions of
large stockholders that in fact occur, the vaunted dispersal of stock
ownership begins to appear less significant (1983, p. 136).
There have been two important parallel phenomena, how-
ever. The first is the infusion of foreign capital into the United
States. The second is the growing amount of corporate stock
being purchased out of private pension funds.
Although it is difficult to gather reliable data on the amount
foreign capitalists have invested in this country, the Federal Re-
serve Board estimated foreign holdings to be 2% of corporate
stock in 1965 and 5% by 1983 (Federal Reserve Board; U.S. News,
1977). This does complicate the Welfare State Capitalism model
a bit. In the end, however, this simply tends to make the esti-
mates more conservative for at least three interrelated reasons.
First, some of the profits garnered by foreigners do not appear
in U.S. governmental statistics on taxable private-sector profits;
and thus the amount of money being extracted from the middle/
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working class is even greater yet. A second point is that these
foreign investments help explain why a smaller share of all do-
mestic corporate stock is presently held by the top 5% of Amer-
icans-a fact which has led to reduced profit totals in the
government-assisted transfers calculated above, even though the
additional money is still being extracted from the pockets of the
American middle/working class and flowing to owners of cap-
ital. Third, it means that the American owning class holds an
even larger share of corporate stock if one focuses only on that
which is held domestically.
A far more significant development is the fact that greater
than 10% of all corporate stock is now held for the middle/work-
ing class by means of their pension fund accounts (Federal Re-
serve Board, 1984).9 For the individual employee, however, these
are relatively small portfolios, are indirectly held and voted for
them, and such investments are often governed by regulations
which limit the investment discretion of their trustees. Never-
theless, should organizations like the AFL-CIO ever succeed in
politicizing their control over these funds-some $608 billion in
1983 (Federal Reserve Board, 1984), a significant power shift
could be in the offing (Drucker, 1976).
On the other hand, one should be very careful not to inter-
pret the decline in the proportion of stock held by the American
owning class to suggest a decline in their economic well being.
Although they do indeed own less of the nation's stock, their
share of overall national wealth has remained relatively steady
at more than 40% of all national wealth throughout the period
under review. 10 Thus, those in the owning class have simply
been more inclined to choose investments other than stock.
Yet, a paradox is beginning to emerge. The after-tax income
gap between the middle/working and owning classes has con-
tinued to widen, whereas the wealth gap has not. But beyond
that, their respective shares of all family income have remained
relatively steady too. The top 5% of American families have
consistently made some 16% of that income, while the middle
three-quarters of the families have been making 79% of it (Cen-
sus Bureau; IRS). And just as mystifying are the trends apparent
in Figure 3.
The growth in the after-tax income gap is most apparent
16 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
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here. First, however, there was some modest levelling in the
latter 1960s during the Great Society period; and, this did seem
to correspond to a decline in tribute payments and can also be
seen in the lessening of the owning class' share of all stock and
general wealth discussed above. Yet, thereafter, these trends re-
verse until owning class tribute, stock, and wealth reach pla-
teaus of sorts, while the income gap literally soars after the
mid-1970s. But how can the income gap between the classes be
widening, while income and wealth shares and tribute have
remained relatively steady?
Focusing on the relationship between the middle/working
and owning classes, there are at least four viable explanations,
each of which will be discussed below. The first two are essen-
tially mathematical in nature; and although the most obvious,
they simply do not explain one of the crucial phenomena. The
other two have greater potential for explaining that latter phe-
nomenon, but they are more tentative.
By simple mathematics, with the owning class receiving more
than three times its income share over time (5% receiving 16%
of all income), and the middle/working class only slightly more
than their own (75% making 79% of all income), the income gap
is bound to grow as the pie expands. In addition, as the owning
class has received billions of dollars in tribute, the total family-
income pie has expanded in 16 of the 20 years under study, and
each class has maintained its share of that expanded pie. That
would seem to support the trickle-down concept. The owning
class continues to get its disproportionate share and thus grows
relatively richer. Nevertheless, the non-owning classes, by pull-
ing down a steady share of an expanding pie, find an overall
growth in real-dollar income as well. Or do they?
It is at this point that the first explanation falls short. Al-
though it helps explain the real-dollar increase in the gap be-
tween middle/working and owning-class incomes, it should be
recalled that the real-dollar income of the middle/working class
has actually been declining. As measured by median family in-
come, it fell by $1,026 real dollars between 1978 and 1984. Con-
sequently, something else must be going on.
A second mathematical approach also appears to hold out
some explanatory hope. It should be remembered that the Wel-
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fare State Capitalism model revolves around the ownership of
corporate capital. Therefore, as the owning class has come to
own a smaller share of the nation's corporate stock, its share of
private-sector profits have declined, reducing "tribute" as cal-
culated by the model. Nevertheless, the fact that they have shifted
their savings into other forms of wealth does not mean that they
are no longer acquiring income from such investments. As a
matter of fact, one can only assume that they would not have
switched investments if they did not feel that that would be a
financially lucrative move. In the end, then, the owning class
appears to be garnering some of their increased income from
"non-capitalist" investments outside the model used in this study,
e.g., certain personal real estate ventures, or whatever. Yet, that
does not explain the real-dollar decline in middle/working class
income either.
Although more difficult to measure given limitations of
available income data, there are two additional approaches which
offer greater hope for resolving the paradox.
First of all, amidst the shift from an industrial-dominated
to a service-dominated economy, there is mounting evidence
that a bimodality is developing within the middle/working class.
Skilled technicians and professionals continue to do well in the
more highly technological era, while much of the rest of the
work force is slipping into the "secondary labor market" (Pohl-
mann, 1986, pp. 14-83, 150-230, 333-378).
George Sternleib and James Hughes note the general phe-
nomenon when looking at constant dollar income distributions
between 1973 and 1982. During that period, there was a growth
in the proportion of the population making $35,000, a clear
shrinkage of the $15,000-$35,000 group, and a growth in the
percentage making less than $15,000 (Sternleib and Hughes,
1984).
The growth at the top reflects the increase in managerial and
professional positions integral to an expanding service economy.
But why the loss of income in the rest of the middle/working
class category? Consider the fact that between 1973 and 1982, for
example, the United States lost 1.3 million manufacturing jobs
which paid an average of $17,000 per year, while adding an even
larger number of service positions which paid an average of
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only $12,000 per year. More Americans had come to be employed
by McDonalds than by either General Motors or U.S. Steel. The
unionization rate for the overall workforce had slipped below
20%-and was lower yet if government workers were excluded.
Meanwhile, roughly one-half of all new jobs created between
1976 and 1985 paid a family head poverty-level wages, while the
number of persons without health insurance rose 32% (Sternleib
and Hughes, 1984; New York Times, 1987a, 1987c; Memphis
Commercial Appeal, 1986, 1987).
As further evidence of this intra-class division, the income
share of the second lowest quintile of American families has
fallen by a full 1% since the mid-1970s, while the middle quin-
tile has fallen one-half of 1%. Conversely, the second highest
quintile has increased its share by 0.4%, and the highest quin-
tile by a full 2%-with only one-quarter of that gain accounted
for by the owning class. On the face of it, those figures may
appear rather miniscule; however, they take on added signifi-
cance given the tremendous consistency of the distribution in
the prior decade. Thus, although the entire group's overall in-
come share remains the same, the majority of the middle/work-
ing class may have been losing ground because of the on-going
change in the labor market. Thus, the group's median income
could decline while its overall income and income share re-
mained steady, propped up by the earnings of the top of this
class grouping.
To make matters worse, these figures actually understate the
trend for at least two reasons: (1) the large Baby Boom genera-
tion has begun to reach its peak earning years; and (2) the num-
ber of multiple-income families has been growing markedly.
Thus, the present does not appear as bad as it has become, and
the future looks even less promising for the next generation of
middle/working class families (Sternleib and Hughes, 1984).
Lastly, as spending on public assistance programs has in-
creased by more than 700% in real dollars since 1965, the bulk
of the middle/working class may well have spent most, if not
more than, their share of the income expansion to help the poorer
20% of American families retain their post-transfer 5% of overall
income. The average owning class family, on the other hand,
would have received enough from their disproportionate share
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of the increased income so that they could pay their proportion
of the tax bill and still emerge with a sizable increase in income.
Directed Wrath
Tax money is collected from the upper-lower and lower-middle
classes (Black and white)-whom I call the "middies"-and fun-
neled through the conduit system to private hands in another seg-
ment of the economy. And all of the while the ignorant,
unsuspecting "middies" think their money is going to help "shift-
less, lazy welfare cheats." Both the middies and the conduits are
being pillaged (Hamilton, 1972, pp. 42-43).
As they have watched their own standard of living decline
since the mid-1970s, it should come as no surprise that the mid-
dle/working class has become frustrated. It is instructive, how-
ever, to note who ended up as a primary target of their wrath.
The words "welfare recipient" seem to conjure up one of two
images in the minds of many middle Americans. The first is the
black female-headed household with numerous small and/or ad-
olescent children, having lived somewhat comfortably on the
dole for years, and probably receiving more aid than it is legally
entitled to receive. The second, even more resented, is the shift-
less black male hanging out on the street comer when he could
actually be working.
Yet, there is a considerable difference between public assis-
tance myth and public assistance reality. The modal relief-re-
ceiving family is white, with one child under 6 years of age,
and has been on relief less than 1 year. More than 60% have
been on less than 3 years, while only about 15% are truly
chronic-staying with the system for 8 years or more (SAUS,
1986, p. 382; New York Times, 1987b; Marable, 1983; Harring-
ton, 1984).
Focusing on AFDC, the bell-weather of the relief package,
more than 70% of the recipients are children. As for the heads
of these households, only a small minority are deemed to be
"able-bodied" (12% in 1977), and most of these are mothers who
are the sole resident-parents of small children. The number of
able-bodied adult males receiving such relief has been estimated
at 1.5% of the caseload (U.S. News, 1972, p. 57); not a partic-
ularly high figure in a period when 5-10% of those actively
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seeking work could not find it. And it has been estimated that
some 90-95% of all recipients are legally eligible, with nearly
half of the ineligibles receiving benefits due to administrative
errors (New York Times, 1977a). The Department of Health, Ed-
ucation, and Welfare actually found less than 3% of AFDC cases
"suspected of fraud" in 1973, 1.6% with "possible questions of
fraud," and 0.8% with "sufficient facts to support" such charges.
Less than 0.2% were ultimately prosecuted (JEC, 1973). Overall,
then, the amount of middle/working class money going to "wel-
fare abusers" is miniscule compared to the amount of their pay-
checks that are transferred to the owning class in the form of
tribute each year.
Nevertheless, polls conducted during a particularly telling
period reflect the average American's increased animosity to-
ward "welfare." Amidst the real-dollar levelling of the mid-1960s,
such attitudes were relatively favorable. For example, a majority
of Americans felt that spending on "welfare and relief programs"
was either not enough or about right (Gallup, 1964). Yet, once
those programs proliferated and the real-dollar incomes of mid-
dle/working class citizens began to decline, this tone changed
considerably. In the latter 1970s, for instance, 58% of Americans
now disapproved of most government-sponsored "welfare" pro-
grams; and two out of three respondents mistakenly believed
public assistance costs even made up a major part of their lo-
cality's expenditures (New York Times, 1977c, 1978b).
How, then, does one move to counteract these lazy, coniving,
overly promiscuous welfare chiselers? The majority of Califor-
nians, for example, cited a desire to reduce "welfare expendi-
tures" as their primary reason for supporting Proposition 13
(New York Times, 1978a). While nationwide, more than 40% of
Americans favored cutting relief programs "alot," and an "over-
whelming number" of those favoring service cuts cited "welfare
and social services" as clearly their most preferred target (New
York Times, 1978a, 1977c, 1978b; Gallup, 1979). As part of the
rationale, more than one-third of Americans incorrectly believed
the majority of recipients were receiving more than they were
legally entitled to (Gallup, 1978); and thus when asked which
welfare reforms were most needed, the majority of Americans
called for "better screening methods." The second most common
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response was to get those who can work off the welfare rolls
(Gallup, 1977).
These attitudes were soon reflected in governmental policy.
The amount of real-dollar expenditures on public assistance lev-
elled out in the 1980s, and the post-transfer income of the bot-
tom one-fifth of American families declined 4.4% in real dollars. 11
Thus, in absolute terms, the rich are getting richer and the
poor are getting poorer-a reality that is both reinforced and
enhanced by "Welfare State Capitalism." And as the middle/
working class got poorer as well, it tended to focus its blame on
highly visible public assistance monies flowing to the poor rather
than the less visible "tribute" flowing to the rich. However, pub-
lic opinion toward "welfare" seems finally to have begun to
moderate as Reagan-era austerity measures, combined with the
economic polarization occurring during deindustrialization, have
left hundreds of thousands homeless and long lines at the soup
kitchens (AuClaire, 1984). Whether such wrath will now be di-
rected toward the owning class remains to be seen.
Conclusion
This study began by asking in what ways and how much
does the American political-economic system function to trans-
fer income between classes. To begin to answer that question
it utilized a "Welfare State Capitalism" model and focused on
income transfers between 1965 and 1984. What it found was a
system that exploits the middle/working class, struggles to
maintain the poor at subsistence, further enhances the dominant
position of the capital-owning class, and leads to an at least
temporary diversion of middle/working class wrath.
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Footnotes
1. Are there significant class divisions within the "middle/working class"?
For example, is there not a significant difference between the Safeway
store manager and the check-out clerks? Clearly the former does have a
degree of power over the latter. However, that manager has been hired
to maximize profits for Safeway stockholders. Thus, decisional leeway is
limited; and the manager's personal interests are subordinated to those
of the company's owners in virtually the very same way the clerk's are.
They are playing different roles, but the bottom line is the same for both.
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They must do what they can to turn acceptable profits for those who own
the institution. And if they fail, they lose their jobs.
As for the self-employed, the proportion of the American population
in that category, with no non-family members working for them, has
shrunk steadily since the nation began and is now less than 8% (Reich,
1972). Yet, this is still a sizable number of people, and as a group they
remain difficult to categorize. They are dearly not capitalists, as they are
not extracting profits from the labor of others. By the same token, they
are not really workers either, as they are not having their labor exploited
by a capitalist. Thus, they end up as a group in between; but in fact,
they can be seen as small-scale glimpse of a socialist-type economic ar-
rangement in which all would control the businesses within which they
labored.
2. As for specific methodology, I took after-tax corporate profit figures from
the Survey of Current Business and converted them to constant 1984 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index. I then subtracted the constant-dollar
Contract Profit, Interest Profit, and Conduit Profit amounts calculated
and discussed in the sections below so as not to double-count them.
Lastly, I used estimates of the percentage of corporate stock held by the
top 5% of American adults (see note #8) in order to calculate the share
of these profits garnered by the "owning class." Now, all of this excludes
profits made by partnerships and proprietorships; but, they tend to be
small firms with relatively few employees, and as a group only account
for approximately 10% of all sales. Nonetheless, in as much as a number
of their owners would fall into my "owning class" category, ignoring their
profits from these firms simply makes my "private-sector profit" figure
a more conservative measure by understating the total.
3. Methodologically, I took the Statistical Abstracts of the United States figures
for all taxes paid each year, and multiplied each by that year's middle/
working class percentage of national income. I then converted the re-
sulting figures into real 1984 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. The
results were as follows: 1965-$2597, 1966-$2810, 1967-$2879, 1968-$2936,
1969-$3263, 1970-$3197, 1971-$3011, 1972-$3278, 1973-$3341, 1974-
$3286, 1975-$3112, 1976-$3155, 1977-$3445, 1978-$3528, 1979-$3507,
1980-$3343, 1981-$3443, 1982-$3277, 1983-$3178. The latter figures are
conservative estimates, however, not only for the reason cited in the text
but also because the recent reduction in the federal income tax burden
has most likely made the overall tax structure regressive. If that is true,
the middle/working class is no doubt paying even more of the nationwide
tax burden today.
It should also be noted that federal Social Security payments are not
being included as "taxes" in this study, even though that is a payment
that is not optional.
4. See note #2 for an explanation of how I estimated the share gained by
the owning class and how such corporate figures are conservative esti-
mates in that they ignore partnerships and proprietorships. Also, it should
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be noted that these figures include both direct cash payments and the
calculated value of "benefits-in-kind."
5. To arrive at these estimates, I took Survey of Current Business figures on
federal, state, and local government purchases of services and durable
and non-durable goods and structures. I then subtracted all money going
to employee compensation-conservatively assuming no income was ac-
crued by the owning class in such transactions-and converted each
yearly figure to constant 1984 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
But at that point I needed to derive an appropriate after-tax average
corporate profit rate for each year, which would then be applied to gov-
ernmental purchase figures in order finally to estimate after-tax corporate
profits from these transactions. Thus, I calculated such a profits-to-sales
ratio by taking the after-tax corporate profit figures calculated above and
dividing them by Survey of Current Business figures on "corporate re-
ceipts" from sales and services less allowances, rebates, and returns (ex-
cluding capital gains/losses and investment income not associated with
taxpaying businesses).
Corporate profits were then calculated as a proportion of govern-
mental purchases each year; and the share captured by the owning class
was calculated as in note #2.
6. These after-tax profit estimates were calculated by first establishing a
functional investor profit rate on loaned money. Given that banks do
most of the lending to government and that roughly 90% of bank reve-
nues come from interest payments, banks' net (after-tax) income was
divided by their current revenues-all using Federal Reserve Board fig-
ures. These calculated "profit rates" were then aplied to total interest paid
on governmental debt each year. The resulting after-tax profits from lend-
ing to government were then reduced to the share gained by the owning
class-as calculated in note #2.
7. In terms of methodology, I took the public assistance figures for years
1968, 1972, 1973, and 1975-1984 (Burke, 1984); and I made estimates for
the years 1965-1967, 1969-1971, and 1974 using both Burke's figures as
well as Statistical Abstracts of the United States totals for AFDC, Supple-
mentary Aid for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, Medicaid, Food Stamps,
and 'General Assistance" in order to guide my extrapolations.
I am focusing on cash paid to the welfare recipient and items/serv-
ices purchased for them, e.g., school lunches and medical care. Specifi-
cally, where approximately one-half was cash and one-third medical
payments in 1968, by 1983 only one-quarter was cash, one-third was still
medical payments, 15% was food, and 10% was housing payments. It is,
of course, presumed that the cash is spent and not saved and/or invested.
These public assistance totals are then multiplied by the average
corporate profit rate for each year (see note #5), and the share going to
the owning class is calculated in the same way it was in note #2.
It is also being assumed that the administrative portion of these
governmental expenditures is being offset by the higher than average
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profits gained in many of these transactions. In addition, there are some
indications that the administrative costs of these programs are actually
relatively low (Social Security Administration, 1972, p. 57), where it is
estimated that the administrative costs for the Supplementary Aid to the
Aged, Blind, and Disabled program were only 1.8% of its budget in
1972.
Lastly, there is some definite overlap between the "conduit profits"
and the "contract profits" discussed earlier. Nonetheless, the earlier fig-
ures are considered conservative enough to more than compensate for
that.
8. Here I took the figures for the top 1% of Americans (Smith and Franklin,
1974) and estimated figures for the top 5%. I accomplished the latter
estimate by first taking Smith and Franklin's calculation for the top 1%
in 1962 and dividing that figure by a calculation for the top 5% (Federal
Reserve Board, 1962, pp. 110-114). The resulting ratio was then applied
to Smith and Franklin's other figures in order to attain the corresponding
estimates for the top 5%. I then extrapolated for the years skipped over
in the Smith and Franklin article. A 1983 estimate was derived by using
dividends reported in 1983 tax returns (IRS, Summer 1983). I then ex-
trapolated around that figure as well.
Stock is defined as common and preferred issues, domestic and for-
eign firms, certificates/shares of building and loan and savings and loan
associations, federal land bank stocks, accrued dividends, and other in-
vestments reporting equity in an enterprise, as well as stock held in trust
(though understated). And, it is being assuemd that the top income re-
cipients and top stockholders are essentially the same group of people at
any particular point in time.
My final estimates for the proportion of stock held by the top 5% of
American adults were: 1965-78%, 1966-77%, 1967-76%, 1968-75%,
1969-74%, 1970-77%, 1971-79%, 1972-81%, 1973-75%, 1974-69%,
1975-64%, 1976-59%, 1977-60%, 1978-60%, 1979-61%, 1980-61%,
1981-62%, 1982-62%, 1983-63%, 1984-63%.
For examples of significantly higher estimates, see Butters (1953,
p. 400) and Parenti (1983, pp. 11-12).
9. With 18% of all stock held by a combination of public and private pen-
sion funds in 1983 (up from 5% in 1965), it seemed safe to estimate that
more than half of that pension-owned stock was held by the middle 75%
of American families.
10. To arrive at my estimates, I began with the 1969 figures compiled by the
Internal Revenue Service (1983). I took their figures for the share of wealth
held by the top 1% and top 5% of American adults. I divided the former
by the latter and applied that ratio to 1965 and 1972 estimates of the share
held by the top 1% in those years (Lampman, 1962; Smith and Calvert,
1965; and Smith). I also applied the ratio to 1976 and 1982 estimates of
the share held by the top 1% in those years (IRS, 1976, 1982).
My resulting estimates for the proportion of the nation's wealth pos-
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sessed by the top 5% of American adults were: 1965-48%, 1969-42%,
1972-44%, 1976-44%, and 1982-42%.
"Wealth" is defined as all corporate stock, trusts, bonds, savings, life
insurance, and real estate-less liabilities.
11. To arrive at this figure, I took the high-income cutoff point for the bottom
20% of American families. In 1980, it was $13,058, but it had declined
to $12,489 by 1984-all in 1984 dollars (Bureau of the Census).
It should be noted, however, that I have not attempted to make ad-
justments for "benefits-in-kind" transfer income. First, it is not dispos-
able income, and thus it ought not to be counted in the same way. Secondly,
such calculations open a real methodological "can of worms." For ex-
ample, if we calculate the disproportionate benefit the poor receive from
Medicaid, why not also calculate the disproportionate benefits the weal-
thiest gain from national defense, State Department trade efforts, do-
mestic infrastructure, and so on? Lastly, even if such benefits are included
(Browning, 1976), they are still funded largely by the middle/working
class.
